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ABSTRACT 
 
NATURAL RESOURCE CURSE: CASE OF MONGOLIA 
    
    By 
   Bardorj Bolortsetseg 
 
Natural resource rich countries have the tendency to grow less than resource poor 
countries. Some mineral rich countries in Africa such as Nigeria, Sudan, Angola and the 
Congo are still less developed: their people live with a low standard of life and are still 
suffering from poverty. Mean while, other East Asian mineral resource poor countries such as 
Hong Kong, Thailand, South Korea and Japan are developing rapidly. They have achieved 
western-level standards of live. The reasons of lover development are the negative impacts of 
the natural resource curse and a lack of management for mitigating it. 
The study undertakes empirical evidences to explore the impacts of the natural 
resource curse. Within an analytical framework based on a literature review on the natural 
resource curse, the study provides further empirical support to the impacts of the natural 
resource curse in Mongolia using technical data. Based on a Chilean experiment on how to 
combat against the natural resource curse, the findings of the study state some suggestions on 
mitigating negative effects.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background  
 Countries with natural resource rich countries have failed to develop rapidly rather 
than countries without natural resource (Figure1).  
Figure1.  GDP comparison of resource wealth countries and resource scarce countries 
        
Natural resource curse phenomena is controversial current issue in Mongolia, because 
it has extensive mineral resources which are considered large part of industrial production: 
copper, gold, coal, molybdenum, tin, tungsten (Appendix A) and Government of Mongolia 
(GOM) has been implemented the policy to achieve development by exploiting and using 
mineral resources. The negative effects of having abundant natural resource are long-term 
trends world commodity price, volatility, crowding out manufacturing, civil war, poor 
institutions and the Dutch disease (Frankel. 2010). The Mongolian mineral sector provides 
20.3% of the country‘s GDP, accounting for 65.4% of the country‘s industrial output and 
42.7% of its export revenue. Even Mongolia has an extensive mineral resource; it has poor 
infrastructure and stagnant Government Institution.  
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Today, Mongolia confronts these curse symptoms and particular difficult challenges 
to avoid natural resource curse by managing wisely mineral resource revenue: GOM needs to 
confirm that this abundant natural resource could lead Mongolia to development. This paper 
explores some empirical evidences that natural resource curse in Mongolia and the Chilean 
applicable model how to achieve development by using mineral resource and avoid natural 
resource curse. 
 
1.2 Research question 
The particular research questions outlined for this study as follows: 
-  What is natural resource curse? 
-  What are the negative effects of natural resource abundance? 
-  Can Mongolia achieve to development growth by using natural resource? 
-  What did Chilean government do against natural resource curse? 
-  How effective is the current policy against natural resource curse in Mongolia? 
-  What economic and financial leverages Mongolian government should implicate 
for mitigating natural resource curse?  
 
1.3 Research methodology 
This study employs variety of research methodology such as collecting and analyzing 
primary and secondary data, generalizing information and comparison methodology.  Also 
case study is important part of this thesis. 
 
      
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
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It has been observed for some decades that the possession of oil, natural gas, or other 
valuable mineral deposits or natural resources does not necessarily confer economic growth. 
Auty (2001) is apparently the one who coined the phrase ―natural resource curse‖ to describe 
this puzzling phenomenon. Its use spread rapidly.
i
 There are many research and studies which 
stated that countries with abundant natural resource have more tended to grow less rapidly 
rather than natural resource scarce countries. In the seventeenth century, resource poor 
Netherlands eclipsed Spain, despite the overflow of gold and silver from the Spanish colonies 
in the New World.  In the nineteenth and the centuries resource poor countries such as 
Switzerland and Japan surged ahead of resource abundant economies such as Russia. In the 
past thirty years, the world‘s star performers have been the resource poor Newly 
Industrializing Economies of East. Raul Prebish and Hans Singer argued that resource based 
economy growth would be ineffective because the world prices of primary exports relative to 
manufactures show a deep tendency toward secular decline. Closely related views held that 
world demand for manufacturers would grow faster than demand for primary products or that 
the rich countries would be more protectionists against primary imports than manufacturing 
imports .(Perbish and Singer.) 
Another set of possibilities is strictly economic, drawing upon the ideas widespread 
in the development literature in the 1940 s and 50 s and in the Dutch disease models more 
recently. In the Dutch disease model, the economy has three sectors: a tradable natural 
resource sector, a tradable (non resource) manufacturing sector, and a non-traded sector. The 
greater the natural resource endowment, the higher is the demand for non tradable goods, and 
consequently, the smaller will be the allocation of labor and capital to the manufacturing  
      
sector. Therefore , when natural resources are abundant, tradable production is concentrated 
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in natural resources rather than manufacturing, and capital and labor that otherwise might be 
employed in manufacturing are pulled into the non- traded goods sector (D.Sachs et al.).  
Further, Thorvaldur Gylfason (2001) stated about five possible channels of 
transmission from natural resource abundance to sluggish to economic growth. First, natural 
resource boom and the associated surge in raw-material exports tend to drive up the value of 
the domestic currency in real terms, and perhaps also increase exchange rate volatility and 
wages, with the result that exports may stagnate or even fall relative to GDP, or may become 
biased away from manufacturing and services. Second, huge natural resource rent may lead 
to rampant rent seeking behavior on the part of the producers. There is much possibility that 
it can occur where imperfect or missing markets, lax of legal structure in many developing 
countries and emerging markets. Third, natural resource abundance may reduce private and 
public incentives to accumulate human capital due to a high level of non-wage income – e.g., 
dividends, social spending, and low taxes. Fourth, and this point is closely related to the 
preceding one, abundant natural resources may imbue people with a false sense of security 
and lead governments to lose sight of the need for good and growth-friendly economic 
management, including free trade, bureaucratic efficiency, and institutional quality. Fifth, 
natural resource abundance may blunt private and public incentives to save and invest and 
thereby reduce economic growth. Specifically, when the share of output that accrues to the 
owners of natural resources rises, the demand for capital falls, and this leads to lower real 
interest rates and less rapid growth
ii
. 
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3. THE IMPACTS OF NATURAL RESOURCE CURSE 
3.1 GDP Dependency on World market price 
Erika Weinthal and Pauline Jones Luong indicated that mineral wealth countries‘ 
reliance on mineral exports (measured as a percentage of GDP) led them to the more slowly 
economic growth. From 1960-1990, GDP per capita in mineral  rich countries increased 1.7 
percent compared to 2.5-3.5 percent in mineral poor countries; similarly, from 1970-1993, 
mineral rich countries grew by only 0.8 percent PCGDP compared to 2.1-3.7 percent in 
mineral poor countries.
iii
 Frankel. J stated that ―Large countries have some control over the 
price at which they can sell exports on world markets, especially if the exports are 
manufactured goods or services. Developing countries, by contrast, tend to be smaller 
economically than major industrialized countries, and more likely to specialize in the exports 
of basic commodities like oil and other minerals. As a result, they are more likely to fit the 
small open economy model: they can be regarded as price-takers, not just for their import 
goods, but for their export goods as well. That is, the prices of their tradable goods are 
generally taken as given on world markets‖.iv Mongolia is developing and small country; 
therefore, it cannot control export and import commodity price. As a result, Mongolia tends 
to be specializing in the exports of mining product, especially copper. Mining sector is the 
main driver for the Mongolian economy (Figure 2). Therefore, mining export takes big 
percentage in export and GDP (Figure 3, 4). 
 
 
 
     
Figure 2 
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The source: www.mram.gov.mn 
 
Figure3.  Mining sector export of Mongolia 
 
 
 
 
      
Figure4.   The percentage of Mining sector in GDP 
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The source: www.mram.gov.mn 
Since, ―Erdenet Mining Corporation‖, which is established in accordance with an 
agreement between governments of Mongolia and (former) Soviet Union, copper has been 
the major export commodity and has played important role in Mongolian economy. EMC is a 
Mongolian-Russian joint venture: 51.0 percent of shares are owned by the State Property 
Committee of Mongolian Government and the Russian Government owns 49.0 percent of 
shares. At present, it is large complex processing 25 million tons of ore per year and 
producing over 530.0 thousand tons of copper concentrate and 3.0 thousand tons of 
molybdenum concentrates annually. Erdenet Mining Corporation is one of the largest 
taxpayer because the company itself pays income tax around 50-60 percent of total budget to 
the tax authority.
v
 Mongolian GDP has been depending on copper world market price since 
Erdenet mining was established and operated.  
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In 2009 Mongolian Government has reached an investment agreement to exploit Oyu 
tolgoi copper deposit with Ivanhoe Mines and Rio Tinto: GOM estimates that will produce 
USD 30 billion in revenue. Oyu Tolgoi LLC, is Mongolia‘s largest copper and gold mining 
company, which will build and operate the Oyu Tolgoi copper-gold project in Southern 
Mongolia. It is scheduled to begin commercial production in 2013.
vi
 GOM‗s economic 
achievement is that specialize mineral product, remarkably copper in the export commodity, 
however, for small and developing countries taking price is rigorous, for instance, 
Mongolia‘s economic growth is totally dependent on copper price in world market. If price 
takers keep prices high, Mongolia‘s revenue collection increases. If they suddenly go down – 
and unpredictability is a feature of every market – the state budget may very well find it has 
too many empty corners. Erika Weinthal and Pauline Jones Luong also stated that mineral 
exporters are more likely to incur greater debt, even as world prices soared, and thus forced to 
commit a significant percentage of their shrinking GDP to debt servicing (Lewis 1984). 
Mongolia has faced this problem, during 2001-2004, the price of copper had been increased 
dramatically on world market, at this time Mongolian GDP has increased follow by world 
market price. In 2005, the price of copper decreased and Mongolian GDP decreased 
simultaneously. Since 2006, copper price on world market has been increased again and in 
2007 Mongolian GDP has reached the highest point ever been (Figure 5). This fluctuation has 
happened in 2009 again, the copper price was 3060 on world market and GDP of Mongolia 
has reached the lowest point (Figure 6). Unpredictable revenue flows because widely 
fluctuating export revenues lead to fluctuating levels in overall government revenues.
vii
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Fluctuation GDP and world market copper price causes the instability of State budget 
(Figure 7).  
The incredible increase of the price of copper in the world market was a bonanza for 
the national coffers and turned the state budget in the following years into an immense cake 
waiting to be cut and distributed. In 2005, 2006, 2007 copper price was hit the highest point 
on world market, simultaneously, there was a positive effect on Mongolian budget, there was 
a surplus during 2005, 2006, 2007. Surprisingly, Mongolian parliament adopted a windfall 
profits tax law in May 2006 levying 68 percent tax on the export price of copper and gold if 
these metals sold for more than US$2,600 and US$500 unit price respectively in the world 
market.
viii
 As a result of this new tax policy, GOM has lost its reputation of political stability 
among other countries and foreign investors.  
Figure 5. 
 
      
 
Figure 6.  The world market copper price  
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Figure 7 
             
      
3.2 Bureaucracy and poor institution 
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Mineral wealth is strongly correlated with poor governance and high levels of 
corruption. According to World Bank Governance Research Indicators and the Transparency 
International‘s Corruption Perception Index, mineral rich countries ranked at the bottom of 
the list among countries (CPI).
ix
 The quality of governance and government institution is the 
most prominent trend of economic development and fundamental factor that which country 
economy performance good and which do not. Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002) use 
as their measure of institutional quality an indicator of the rule of law and protection of 
property rights (taken from Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton, 2002). Acemoglu, Johnson, 
and Robinson (2001) use a measure of expropriation risk to investors. Acemoglu, Johnson, 
Robinson, and Thaicharoen (2003) measure the quality of a country‘s ―cluster of institutions‖ 
by the extent of constraints on the executive. The theory is that weak institutions lead to 
inequality, intermittent dictatorship, and lack of any constraints to prevent elites and 
politicians from plundering the country.
x
 Of the various possible channels through which 
natural resources could be a curse to long-run development, the quality of institutions and 
governance is perhaps the most widely hypothesized (Frankel J, 2010). Other research and 
papers indicated that poor institution and governance is the major problem of poor 
development of mineral rich countries. For example: Hodler (2006) and Caselli (2006), Leite 
and Weidmann (1999) found and stated about how poor institutions reflected natural resource 
curse. In accordance with Amber‘s research, countries reliant on natural resource tend to have 
weaker governance and institutions. While this correlations are not strong, countries whose 
resource export account for more than 15% of GDP score significantly worse in terms of 
corruption, civil liberties, political rights and democracy. 
     
Figure 8  Comparison of corruption level 
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Amber explains Figure 8 that the weak relationship between resource wealth and 
governance could be interpreted as supporting the criticism of resource dependence as a 
measure of natural resources. If countries are dependent on these revenues because they fail 
to institute policies protecting the economy and institutions against the detrimental impacts of 
rent-seeking, if countries with weak institutions tend to have weak economies that result in 
reliance on resource revenues, or if those in power in countries with weak institutions choose 
to retain political control by promoting reliance on the resource sector, these findings would 
make sense: we would expect countries dependent on resources to also have weak 
governance and would expect resource wealth to have a weaker relationship with governance. 
According to the final report of project ―Public Monitoring of corruption in the 
Mongolian mining sector‖ the rapid expansion of mining sector has increasingly become a 
major source of corruption (WWF, Mongolia Program office).  Mongolia has ranked 120
th
  
      
out of 180 countries by corruption estimation of Transparency International to identify where 
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corruption blocks good governance and accountability, in order to break its corrosive cycle 
(Transparency International, 2009).  Mining boom in Mongolia is one of the major derivation 
of corruption which main indicator of good governance. This poor institution‘s symptoms of 
natural resource curse have happened among Mongolian Political circumstances. 
In 2008, the state budget showed a surplus, for the first time ever, thanks to the 
substantial increase in the international price of copper. The end of 2007 Mongolian 
parliament discussed the shape of next year‘s state budget and drawing up the framework of 
Mongolia‘s socio-economic growth until 2008. Instead of debating issues from a broad 
national standpoint, the members of parliament however seem more inclined to spend the 
money on a social awards system that they promised to institute when campaigning for the 
parliamentary election of 2004. They have already decided to give Tg100, 000 annually to 
every child under the age of 18. In their wisdom, politicians thus have turned the surplus 
funds into giveaways. This will certainly earn them good publicity, but the fund which was 
established by GOM to allocate the revenue actually not meant to be used for creating jobs in 
a national effort to reduce unemployment and poverty, or for improving the infrastructure in 
various sectors. Many analysts have sharply criticized our legislators for scattering public 
money in all directions. Furthermore, members of the ruling coalition as well as some 
opposition MPs supported a move to allocate Tg250 million to every electoral district of 
parliament under the name of ―investing in the rural population‖. The Democratic Party 
strongly condemned this proposal, saying it would destroy the basic principles of a 
democratic election. Analysts have called this move ―legalized corruption‖. A true welfare 
state does not give cash handouts to sections of society, but instead uses up the nation‘s  
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resources equitably to set up a socio-economic structure where such handouts will become 
redundant. 
3.3  Dutch disease in Mongolia 
The Economist magazine defined that ―The Dutch Disease refers to some possibly 
unpleasant side effects of a boom in oil or other mineral and agricultural commodities‖. The 
Dutch Disease can arise from commodity booms due to the discovery of new deposits or 
some other expansion in supply, leading to a trade surplus via exports or a capital account 
surplus via inward investment to develop the new resource.
xi
 International economists use the 
term to explain the deindustrialization of a nation‘s economy that occurs when the discovery 
of a natural resource raises the value of that nation‘s currency, making manufactured goods 
less competitive with other nations, increasing imports and decreasing exports. The term 
originated in the Netherlands after discovery of North Sea gas. In the early 1960s, when the 
North Sea gas reserves were discovered, the Dutch economy was provided with a relatively 
cheap and reliable source of energy for its domestic needs, while the reduction of oil imports 
and the export of the gas contributed to a positive international trade balance. The enormous 
rise in revenues meant the Dutch were able to set up and sustain a generous welfare state. 
However, with the newfound wealth causing the Dutch guilder to rise in value, the country‘s 
exports of manufactured goods suffered in the harshly competitive world market. In the 
1970s, the same thing befell the British economy. With the exploration of oil off the coast of 
Scotland, Britain became an overall exporter of oil while it had previously been a net 
importer. The pound soared in value, but the country fell into recession when British workers 
demanded higher wages and exports became uncompetitive. Generally, all resource rich  
      
countries tend to be less developing rather than resource poor countries, therefore there is 
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evidence that resource rich countries have more Dutch disease (Figure 9). 
Some politicians and economists seriously criticize about Dutch disease in Mongolia, 
which the cause of booming FDI in mining sector since 2000. They argue that we could see 
several symptoms of Dutch disease in Mongolia.  
Figure 9.    Dutch disease measure for resource rich and other countries 
 
Source: Chenery and Syrquin (1975) 
Mongolia‘s economy is in same situation of Dutch disease. Complacency with 
mineral prices is encouraging us to concentrate on mining exploitation, and the national 
manufacturing sector is becoming less and less competitive.  The mining sector grew at more 
than double the rate of the country‘s average economic growth in 2002-2005. In the same 
period the manufacturing sector grew by 19 percent in 2002, showed no growth in 2003, and 
then declined by 24.1 percent in 2004, according to official statistics (Figure 10).   
    
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 The comparison the Mining sector and other sectors  
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Source: National Statistic Office of Mongolia 
Table1.        Manufacturing sector’s vulnerability  
Resource extraction Manufacturing 
Capital intense  Not capital intense 
Labor intense 
Large returns to scale Smaller returns to scale 
Doe not catalyze human capital development Catalyzes development of human capital 
Because external actors import the 
technology to extract most minerals and 
fuels, doe not catalyze technological progress 
Catalyzes technological progress 
Assets highly specific Assets less specific 
High barriers to entry Low barriers to entry 
Few connections to other sectors of the 
economy 
Connected to upstream and downstream 
sectors 
 
Employment, human capital and innovation are underscored as important benefits of 
the manufacturing sector ( Table 1). For manufacturing sector human capital and labor force 
is important, in opposite for extractive industry the same is not necessary true. In fact, capital 
intensity of the extractive sector may crowd out demand for domestic labor, particularly since  
it is often dominated by foreign investment and transnational corporations (Ross 2003). The 
lower labor demand, and thus lower wages, in resource centric economies leads to reduced 
incentive for individuals to seek education. Mongolia is in the same condition that Dutch 
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disease has occurred on labor force too. More and more Mongolians are working for foreign-
invested mining companies than in the national manufacturing sector. In the last three years, 
the number of workers in the minerals sector has gone up by around 10,000 people while the 
manufacturing sector suffers from a lack of manpower. The reason of labor force shift to 
mining sector is relatively high income comparing to other manufacturing sector.  
 
4. CHILE IS COMBATING AGAINST NATURAL RESOURCE CURSE 
Chile is a country in east America and it is the largest copper producer country in the 
world, supplying 43 percent of world copper exports. Therefore, Chilean Government also 
face the challenges how to allocate this big revenues from export of copper. Some related 
questions this case study cites are: How is the Chilean Government managing this boom in 
copper revenues? How have this rising price effected the non-copper sectors? How have the 
fiscal rule and the stabilization fund for copper helped to manage these revenues? How Chile 
combat natural resource curse? 
 According to Alex A. Ruehle and Kishore G. Kulkarni stated that Chilean economy is 
not really affected by the negative effect of natural resource curse by using regression 
analysis.  
Copper is the major top commodity product and in 2000 copper accounted 40.5% of 
export earnings and 25 % of GDP. In the decade leading up to 2000, when the country's GDP  
grew by an annual 7% making it one of the world's fastest-growing economies mining 
accounted for 8.5% of Chile's GDP and 47% of exports. In 1973, copper alone accounted for 
80% of foreign exchange; the government has since implemented a policy of export 
diversification. Demand for copper remained strong, and exports in 2000 earned $7.3 billion, 
up from $5.9 billion in 1999. The mineral industry employed 46,150 in 2000, or 2% of the 
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labor force, with 38,034 workers in the metals sector 31,849 in copper mining and 5,313 
miners in the industrial minerals sector. During the 1990s, investment in mining activities 
accounted for 34.9% of foreign investment in Chile. In 2000, investment totaled $1.36 billion, 
and it was expected to reach $1.94 billion in 2001, owing to a number of expansion projects. 
Copper output totaled 4.6 million tons in 2000, 4.8% above the 1999 level and up from 3.1 
million in 1996—2000 saw a significant recovery in the price of copper and a strong drop in 
metal stocks.
xii
 During 2003-2007, copper price has increased eight-fold (Figure 11). This 
copper price increase could be expected the boost of export to the copper industry. 
Figure11.      The world market copper price 
 
     
This is can be observed in next Figure, which shows comparison of Chilean copper 
export volume, the agricultural goods export volume, and the industrial manufacturing 
exports (Figure 12).  
Figure 12.     The Chilean copper, agriculture and industrial goods 
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Alex A. Ruehe and Kishore G proved that Chilean economy is not really affected by 
Dutch disease, in other word Chilean Government carried out policy successfully against 
natural resource curse. Alex A. Ruehe and Kishore G. Kulkarni compared before copper 
booming Chilean economy and after booming economy by analyzing Correlation matrix of 
key Chilean economic sectors (Table 2).    
Table 2 . Correlation matrix of key Chilean economic sectors (1997-2001)
xiii
 
 Agricultural 
production 
Copper 
mining 
Total 
manufacturing  
Construction Public 
administration 
Agricultural 
production 
1.000     
Copper mining .172 1.000    
      
Total 
manufacturing 
-3.37 .317 1.000   
Construction .071 -.460 -.005 1.000  
Public 
administration 
0.59 .947 .480 -.380 1.000 
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This table shows that before copper booming, copper mining correlates strongly only 
with public administration, the reason is that in fact, 10% of government revenues are directly 
attributable to the copper industry.
xiv
 
Table 3 shows that during copper booming period copper mining, construction, 
manufacturing and public administration industries became strongly correlated. Agricultural 
production, however, remained uncorrelated with copper or any other economic activity, 
maybe the result of seasonality of agricultural production. The important fact that 
manufacturing sector performed well during this period. The strong correlation between 
manufacturing and mining sectors indicated that de-industrialization did not take place.
xv
 
This means that Chile has not been suffering of negative effects from its booming copper 
industry. 
Table 3. Correlation matrix of key Chilean economic sectors (2001-2006)
xvi
 
 Agricultural 
production 
Copper 
mining 
Total 
manufacturing 
Construction Public 
administration 
Agricultural 
production 
1.000     
Copper 
mining 
-3.14 1.000    
Total 
manufacturing 
.062 .648 1.000   
Construction .222 .601 .734 1.000  
Public 
administration 
.160 .539 .937 .845 1.000 
 
Besides Alex A. Ruehe and Kishore G‘s research, there is a bunch of empirical data 
which indicate that Chilean Government‘s monetary and fiscal policy was efficient against 
Dutch disease.  The robust copper price boom of the last three years has put the fiscal 
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framework to the test. Due to continued adherence to the structural budget surplus rule, which 
was maintained by the current administration upon taking office in March 2006, the 
consolidated (central government and central bank) budget surplus rose to nearly 8% of GDP  
in 2006 (Ministry of Finance, 2006a). Consistently, the gross consolidated public debt-to-
GDP ratio came down to less than 25% of GDP at end-2006 as a result of several years of 
robust fiscal performance. Owing to this reduction in gross indebtedness, coupled with a 
further accumulation of assets during 2006, the consolidated net debt is now negative. The 
level of indebtedness of the public-enterprise sector is also declining gradually to around 5.5% 
of GDP on a net basis at end-2006, as is the stock of publicly guaranteed debt (about 1.5% of 
GDP at end-2006) and recognition bonds (about 12% of GDP at end-2006) associated with 
the pension reform of the early 1980s (discussed in the 2005 Survey; OECD, 2005). 
1. Recent Policy actions 
The enactment of the Fiscal Responsibility Law in September in 2006 was the most 
important step. The FRL embeds the structural budget surplus rule in law and introduces 
explicit formal mechanisms for capitalizing the central bank and for dealing with pension-
related contingencies, as recommended in the OECD (2005). At the same time, the 
methodology for calculating the structural budget surplus target was adjusted to include 
revenue from molybdenum – a copper derivative that Chile exports in large amounts and 
whose price has been volatile in international markets, thereby affecting public finances – and 
those accruing from the taxation of privately-owned mining companies
xvii
. This fiscal 
responsibility legislation was introduced OECD area and Latin American countries as an 
integral part of institutional reform in the fiscal area. Furthermore, Chilean Government used 
some fiscal discipline in the face of rising tax revenues and copper royalties.  
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At the same time booming copper export, Chilean Government has decided to 
diversify its export commodity. Chile‘s positioning and response is consistent with IMF 
advice: ―policymakers need to manage the inevitable structural changes in the economy so as 
to ensure economic stability. They may also want to continue to diversify exports to reduce 
dependency on the booming sector and make them less vulnerable to external shocks, such as 
a sudden drop in commodity prices.‖ Due to these factors, Chile has achieved prosperity in 
the face of Dutch disease. 
Further, as Chilean‘s national income increased due to the copper boom, the Chilean 
import increased proportionally (Figure 13). Alex A. Ruehe and Kishore G argued, increasing 
import would have limited money supply growth in Chile and mitigated the effects of Dutch 
disease (Ruehle et al). 
Figure 13.   The Chilean copper export 
 
For instance, rather than spending increased copper revenues and expanding the 
money supply, the Chilean government elected to retire debt and invest overseas to sterilize 
the boom revenue. The approach is, not to bring all the revenues into the country all at once, 
and to save some of the revenues abroad in special funds and bring them in slowly. 
Sterilization will reduce the spending effect. Another benefit of letting the revenues into the 
country slowly is that it can give a country a stable revenue stream, rather than not knowing 
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how much revenue it will have from year to year.
xviii
 Chile has successfully set up monetary 
discipline and fiscal policy to mitigate the severity of Dutch disease within its borders. 
     
5.  SUGGESTION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The most recent and popular suggestion and solutions are emphasize macroeconomic 
policies, economic diversification, natural resource funds, transparency and accountability, as 
direct distribution as mechanism for managing mineral wealth wisely.
xix
 Based on other 
resource wealth countries ‗experience for combating natural resource curse Michelle Sieff 
delivered two basic ways to reduce the thread of Dutch disease: : by slowing the appreciation 
of the real exchange rate and by boosting the competitiveness of the manufacturing sector. 
Chilean economic policy against natural resource curse is the most appropriate model for 
Mongolian economy. The reason I suggest Chilean model against natural resource curse and 
Dutch disease for Mongolia is both of these countries economy is totally relying on world 
copper price. IMF advice was to diversify export and encourage other export commodity, 
therefore, Chilean Government diversified export commodity after booming copper export. 
Secondly, as I mentioned before, Chilean Government carried out fiscal discipline and 
monetary policy. Based on that, my suggestion is first, Mongolian Government should 
encourage diversifying export commodity, however, copper export percentage is not really 
big comparing Chile.  Nevertheless, ―Oyu tolgoi‖, the strategically important deposit of 
copper and gold, will operate copper from 2013 and GOM predicts that it will produce 
450,000 tons copper per a year, thus, Mongolian copper export will increase dramatically. 
Moreover Erika Weinthal and Pauline Jones Luong proposed economic diversification. With 
the endorsement of developmental economists and international organizations, such as United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the United Nations Economic Commission, 
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and the World Bank, from the 1960s until the early 1980s most mineral rich countries made  
considerable investments in promoting other economic sectors.
xx
  In other hand, good 
institution and governance is prominent for mitigating the negative effect of natural resource 
curse. Concentrating on strengthen governance and diminishing corruption among 
governance organization is crucial.  
In terms of monetary policy, proportionally, if copper export increase dramatically, 
money reserve will increase. International reserves held by Banco Centrel de Chile 
throughout the copper boom and preceding years. Chilean Government limited money supply 
by purifying the cash inflows: exercised monetary discipline, rather than spending the 
revenue from copper, Chilean government was tended to retire debt and invested overseas to 
sterilize the boom revenue. As Michelle Sieff explained, it is crucial that not to bring all the 
revenues into the country all at once, and to save some of the revenues abroad in special 
funds and bring them in slowly. Sterilization will reduce the spending effect. Another benefit 
of letting the revenues into the country slowly is that it can give a country a stable revenue 
stream, rather than not knowing how much revenue it will have from year to year. As same as 
Chile did, GOM invest overseas to sterilize boom revenue. 
Another suggestion that, GOM must spend the revenue from export of mineral 
commodity wisely, rather than allocate cash to the public, investing to improvement of 
infrastructure and education is radical. Michelle stated that investing in education and 
infrastructure is able to increase the competitiveness of the manufacturing sector. An 
alternative is that a government can resort to protectionism, that is, increase subsidies or 
tariffs. 
Many economists and politicians suggest establishing the Fund. Stabilization funds 
aim to reduce the impact of commodity price volatility on the economy and, in turn, improve  
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budget predictability by stabilizing spending patterns.
xxi
 Many countries established Funds 
such as Government Pension Fund in Norway, the Stabilization Fund of the Russian 
Federation or the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan or the Future Generations Fund of the State of 
Kuwait established in 1976. Actually, to beat the resource curse, Mongolia‘s government has 
proposed a law based on a Chilean measure that will save surplus revenue from mineral 
royalties when prices are high to stabilize the budget when they fall. Therefore, GOM has 
established Human development fund in 2009, right after reach the agreement of exploiting 
―Oyu tolgoi‖ with English and Australian companies, to distribute the revenue from mining to 
citizens. However, the empirical evidence also indicates that natural resource fund is 
ineffective in corrupted and poor institutionalized countries. This suggestion is truly related to 
strengthening capacity of institutions; by reason of the empirical evidence indicated that 
widely absent of institutional capacity is the most urgent reason of suffering mineral rich 
countries. The improvement and strengthening the institution capacity of this Human 
development fund is one of my suggestions. 
Louis-Philippe Beland and Raaj Tiagi suggest that resource wealth countries should 
improve the rule of law to protect rights, encourage investment and reduce corruption (2009). 
Without proper mechanism of settlement of disputes and security of property rights, many 
mutually beneficial exchanges are prevented, thus undermining the market-exchange system. 
Second, trade barriers should be removed. Developing nations tend to have smaller domestic 
markets and therefore could benefit from opening their markets to international trade while 
gaining access to bigger markets. Thirdly, resource wealth countries should simplify business 
regulations by encouraging investment and business creation by eliminating unnecessary 
regulatory barriers, reducing corruption, and therefore decreasing the administrative costs on  
business. Reforming legal system and enacting efficient legal regulation that could control 
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spending state revenue is the first step to implement in. 
In conclusion, Mongolian economy is affecting by natural resource curse: there are 
several signals such as GDP dependency on world commodity price especially copper price; 
natural resource endowment induces poor governance and institutions and Dutch disease, 
finally, it causes civil war and these signals alarmed us that Mongolia has started to suffer 
from natural resource curse. This paper analyzes Chilean economy, which is not really 
affected by natural resource curse, and what Chilean government did against natural resource 
curse and Dutch disease. Chile is now considered the country which could turn the natural 
resource curse into blessing. Mongolia still has an opportunity to turn the curse into blessing: 
this paper‘s purpose is to suggest some recommendation to avoid and mitigate the curse 
based on Chilean experience. Mongolian development is really based on how to use natural 
resource efficiently, how to turn natural resource curse into blessing.  
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APPENDIX 1      NATURAL RESOURCE OF MONGOLIA 
 
 
 
Natural Resource 
 
Number of Deposits 
Gold 
 
511 
Copper 
 
6 
Molybdenum 
 
3 
Lead 
 
4 
Zinc 
 
4 
Tin 
 
12 
Tungsten 
 
17 
Iron 
 
29 
Coal 
 
85 
Fluorite 
 
83 
Limestone 
 
48 
Clay 
 
81 
Sand and Gravel 
 
84 
Sand for construction materials 
 
53 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRELATION BETWEEN RESOURCE DEPENDENCE AND OUTCOMES OF 
INTEREST 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GDP GDP 
Growth 
Stability Corruption Democracy 
 
Resource 
Dependence 
 
 
-.11 
 
-.06 
 
-.33 
 
.12 
 
-.24 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
 
 
AVERAGE GROWTH OF (LOG) GDP PER CAPITA, BY DEPENDANCE UPON  
NATURAL RESOURCES, 1970-2006 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
 
AVERAGE GROWTH RATE OF (LOG) GDP PER CAPITA OF THE 26 HIGHLY 
RESOURCE-DEPENDENT COUNTRIES, BY LEVEL OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM, 1970-
2006 
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APPENDIX 5 
 
 
 
 
Social Fund 
feature 
Costs and Hazards Benefits 
Participatory - Difficult to reach the poorest 
-  Risking elite capture of 
process 
- Externalities not considered 
by individual communities 
- Free-riding 
- Can slow down process 
- Accountability 
- Reduces informational 
asymmetries 
- Can help build civil 
society capacity 
- Encourages civil 
development of 
intermediaries, 
including NGOs 
 
Multisectoral - Broad purview places heavy 
demands on executing agency 
-  
- Encourages local 
initiative 
- Allows funds to be 
spent where there is 
greatest demand 
Autonomy - Makes transfer of lessons 
learned to line agencies more 
difficult 
- Diverts attention and 
resources from reforming line 
agencies 
- More difficult to coordinate 
consideration of externalities 
- Flexibility 
- Speed of 
implementation 
- Responsiveness to local 
needs 
- Funding decisions more 
insulated from political 
influence from above 
- Where formal 
government institutions 
are extremely weak, can 
fill the gaps 
- Can reduce funds 
available for sovereign 
capture 
- Social funds ―model‖ 
more efficient 
procedures for the 
public sector 
- More difficult to 
coordinate rent-seeking  
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